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OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Don Karns and Robert Parker filed civil rights actions 
against the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJ Transit”) and 
NJ Transit Officers Kathleen Shanahan and Sandra McKeon 
Crowe in their official and individual capacities, alleging 
violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Officers Shanahan and Crowe arrested Karns and Parker for 
defiant trespass and obstruction of justice after Karns and 
Parker refused to vacate the NJ Transit train platform on which 
they were preaching without the required permit.  The District 
Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity 
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grounds.  This consolidated appeal followed.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
I. 
 
 Karns and Parker are evangelical Christian ministers 
who regularly preach the Christian gospel.  At around 6:00 a.m. 
on June 26, 2012, Karns and Parker were loudly preaching on 
the railway platform at the Princeton Junction station, which is 
owned by NJ Transit.  They also carried signs with Bible verses 
on them.  Parker had previously been informed that a permit 
was required to preach on NJ Transit property pursuant to N.J. 
Admin. Code § 16:83-1.1, which provides that persons wishing 
to engage in non-commercial speech on NJ Transit property 
are required to obtain a non-commercial certificate of 
registration.1  Appendix (“App.”) 118.  Karns was apparently 
unaware of this requirement.  App. 244–45.  Neither Karns nor 
                                              
1 Permits are available on a first-come, first-served basis.  App. 
241.  All permits are approved as long as the applicant executes 
the permit and states his or her understanding of the relevant 
regulations.  App. 243.  NJ Transit typically issues ten to 
twenty permits weekly.  App. 243.  Indeed, the record shows 
that between June 2012 and July 2012, NJ Transit received 
forty-six permit requests, including thirty from religious 
organizations or entities and fifteen from political campaigns 
or entities.  App. 116; 118–19.  Only two of these requests were 
denied, either because the permit was returned too late or not 
at all.  App. 119–20.  Permit holders are required to remain at 
specific locations within the station as determined by the 
station manager to ensure the safety of NJ Transit customers 
and permit holders.  App. 241–42.   
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Parker applied for or obtained such a permit during the period 
leading up to the incident giving rise to this lawsuit.   
 
Officers Shanahan and Crowe are law enforcement 
officers who are NJ Transit employees.  NJ Transit maintains 
a policy that its officers be familiar with and uniformly enforce 
the permitting regulations, and all NJ Transit officers were 
instructed on this policy.  App. 136; App. 470–71; App. 858.  
This policy was communicated in an email dated May 6, 2010 
from NJ Transit Deputy Chief Joseph Kelly.  App. 136.  The 
email instructed that in the event a NJ Transit officer observes 
an individual engaging in non-commercial speech without a 
permit, the officer should explain the permitting rules and 
provide information about the permit application process.  
App. 136.  The email directed that the officer shall take 
“appropriate enforcement action” if the individual has been 
made aware of the application process and permit requirement 
and continues to engage in non-commercial expression.  App. 
136.  
 
While on patrol on the morning of June 26, 2012, 
Officers Shanahan and Crowe received a radio dispatch 
informing them that individuals were preaching loudly on the 
Princeton Junction station platform.  This was not the first 
incident of loud preaching on NJ Transit property.  Rather, 
there had been several incidents involving “[c]ommuters 
complaining of loud preaching at different stations” throughout 
the NJ Transit system.  App. 470.   
 
In response to the dispatch call, Officers Shanahan and 
Crowe approached the Princeton Junction station.  The officers 
were able to hear shouting emanating from the platform from 
as far as the parking lot beside the station.  Once on the train 
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platform, Officers Shanahan and Crowe approached Karns and 
Parker, noticing that Parker’s behavior “was not the normal 
behavior of a commuter” and that he “was shaking 
uncontrollably.”  App. 208.  Officer Crowe indicated that she 
“wasn’t paying attention to what [the plaintiffs] were saying” 
as she approached them.  App. 197.  Karns and Parker ceased 
preaching as the officers approached them.  Parker took out his 
cell phone to record the encounter, but Officer Shanahan 
requested that he put it away.  Parker eventually complied.  The 
officers then asked Karns and Parker whether they had a permit 
to speak at the station.  They responded that they did not.  
Officer Shanahan informed them that a permit was required, 
but Parker responded that he had been preaching at the station 
for years without any form of permit. 
 
The officers then asked Parker to provide identification.  
Parker produced an expired college identification card.  Karns 
refused to provide any form of identification.   Believing that 
Karns and Parker were interfering with their investigation by 
failing to produce sufficient identification, the officers then 
arrested Karns and Parker and charged them each with one 
count of obstruction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a) and 
one count of obstruction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(b).  
Karns and Parker were also each charged with one count of 
defiant trespass in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b) on 
the basis of the officers’ belief that engaging in non-
commercial expression on NJ Transit property without a 
permit constitutes trespassing.   
 
Karns was ultimately acquitted of all charges.  The 
obstruction of justice charges against Parker were dismissed, 
but he was convicted of defiant trespass.  That charge was 
ultimately reversed by the New Jersey Superior Court.  
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On June 26, 2014, Karns and Parker jointly filed a 
complaint against NJ Transit and Officers Shanahan and 
Crowe in their official and individual capacities.  The District 
Court ordered Karns to file an amended complaint and Parker 
to file a separate complaint.  On July 14, 2014, Karns and 
Parker filed individual complaints, each alleging violations of 
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  The actions 
were consolidated for discovery purposes, and NJ Transit and 
the officers moved for summary judgment.  On March 31, 
2016, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
all of the defendants and against Karns and Parker.   
 
Karns and Parker filed this timely appeal.   
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment and apply the same standard as the District Court.  
Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 
2016); Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We review de novo the legal grounds underpinning 
a claim of qualified immunity or sovereign immunity.  Halsey 
v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014); Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 
III. 
 
Karns and Parker first argue that the District Court erred 
by concluding that NJ Transit was an “arm of the state” entitled 
to claim immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh 
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Amendment.  They relatedly argue that NJ Transit is liable for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maintaining 
unconstitutional policies relating to the permitting scheme.  We 
have considered Karns’s and Parker’s arguments and, for the 
following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 
A. 
 
 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides:  “The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The Supreme 
Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), “extended the 
Eleventh Amendment’s reach to suits by in-state plaintiffs, 
thereby barring all private suits against non-consenting States 
in federal court.”  Lombardo v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 
F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted).  Immunity 
from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is 
designed to preserve the delicate and “proper balance between 
the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of 
the States.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999).  The 
Eleventh Amendment serves two fundamental imperatives:  
safeguarding the dignity of the states and ensuring their 
financial solvency.  See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994) (identifying “States’ solvency 
and dignity” as the concerns underpinning the Eleventh 
Amendment).   
 
It is “well established that even though a State is not 
named a party to the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred 
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by the Eleventh Amendment.”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651, 663 (1974).2  The Eleventh Amendment immunizes from 
suit in federal court both non-consenting states and those 
entities that are so intertwined with them as to render them 
“arms of the state.”  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir. 2007), amended on reh’g (Mar. 8, 
2007).  Eleventh Amendment immunity does not, however, 
extend to counties and municipalities despite their status as 
political subdivisions of a state.  See Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 813 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc).  In 
determining whether an entity is entitled to immunity, we must 
consider “the provisions of state law that define the agency’s 
character,” but the ultimate question of “whether a particular 
state agency [is] . . . an arm of the State, and therefore ‘one of 
the United States’ within the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment, is a question of federal law.”  Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430 n.5 (1997).  
 
We apply a fact-intensive three-part test to determine 
whether an entity is an “arm of the state” for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes.  Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 
Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing Urbano 
v. Bd. of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 250–51 (3d Cir. 1969)).  We 
                                              
2 As we have discussed in other contexts, “the Eleventh 
Amendment does not define the scope of the States’ sovereign 
immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that 
immunity.”  Lombardo, 540 F.3d at 195 (quoting Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002)).  
This case principally concerns only immunity from suit in 
federal court — Eleventh Amendment immunity — and not 
immunity from liability, and thus we address only that aspect 
of sovereign immunity herein.   
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examine the following factors:  “(1) whether the payment of 
the judgment would come from the state; (2) what status the 
entity has under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy 
the entity has.”  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 546.  Subsequent to 
“identifying the direction in which each factor points, we 
balance them to determine whether an entity amounts to an arm 
of the State.”  Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 
84 (3d Cir. 2016).   
 
We historically considered the first factor — the state-
treasury factor — as “most important.”  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
659; see also Bolden, 953 F.2d at 818.  Hence, in Fitchik itself, 
we concluded that because the funding factor disfavored 
immunity and because the remaining two factors — status 
under state law and the degree of autonomy — only “slightly” 
favored a finding of immunity, NJ Transit was not entitled to 
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity.  873 F.2d at 664.  Since 
our decision in Fitchik, however, we have “recalibrated the 
factors,” Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s intervening precedent in Regents of the University of 
California v. Doe.  In Regents of the University of California, 
the Supreme Court recognized that “it is the entity’s potential 
legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a 
third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the 
first instance, that is relevant” to the Eleventh Amendment 
inquiry.  519 U.S. at 431.  The Court emphasized that the 
inquiry into immunity from suit in federal court is not merely 
“a formalistic question of ultimate financial liability.”  Id.; see 
also Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 302 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Regents of the 
University of California has led us to depart from the analytical 
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framework articulated in Fitchik, and we thus “no longer 
ascribe primacy to the [state-treasury] factor.”  Benn v. First 
Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under 
this evolved approach, none of the three Fitchik factors is 
“predominant.”  Cooper, 548 F.3d at 301.  Rather, each of the 
factors is considered “co-equal,” Benn, 426 F.3d at 240, and 
“on the same terms,” Cooper, 548 F.3d at 302.  We emphasize 
that courts should not simply engage in a formulaic or 
mechanical counting up of the factors, nor do we do so 
here.  Rather, each case must be considered on its own terms, 
with courts determining and then weighing the qualitative 
strength of each individual factor in the unique factual 
circumstances at issue.  See Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84 
(explaining that each cases requires a “fresh analysis” and 
“‘individualized determinations’ for each entity claiming 
Eleventh Amendment immunity” (quoting Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir. 
2007))).  While the Fitchik Court’s analysis of each individual 
factor “remains instructive,” Cooper, 548 F.3d at 302, we 
consider and weigh each factor on the record before us today.  
 
Notwithstanding this fundamental shift in our approach 
to Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis, Karns and Parker 
argue that the balancing analysis we conducted in Fitchik must 
control the outcome of this case.  Karns and Parker specifically 
maintain that NJ Transit is collaterally estopped3 from raising 
                                              
3 Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prohibits 
relitigation of an issue that has been fully and fairly litigated 
previously.  The elements for collateral estoppel are satisfied 
when:  “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as 
that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually 
litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; 
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an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense because in Fitchik 
we determined that the three factors, on balance, weighed 
against affording Eleventh Amendment immunity to NJ 
Transit.  See Karns and Parker Br. 14–15.  This argument 
overlooks the significant evolution of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and our own conforming law in this area since 
Fitchik.  Contrary to Karns’s and Parker’s suggestion, 
collateral estoppel is not appropriate when the “controlling 
facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the 
[prior] judgment.”  Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
155 (1979); see also Duvall v. Att’y. Gen. of United States, 436 
F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[Collateral estoppel] . . . will 
not preclude relitigation of the issue when there is . . . a material 
intervening change in governing law.”).  Collateral estoppel, 
then, does not preclude us from reconsidering our balancing of 
the Fitchik factors in light of intervening Supreme Court 
precedent.  
 
Our Internal Operating Procedures also do not prevent 
us from revisiting the balancing analysis conducted in Fitchik.  
Pursuant to those procedures, “the holding of a panel in a 
                                              
and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior 
judgment.”  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 342 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 524–25 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Karns and 
Parker here invoke a variant of this doctrine, known as 
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, in which “a plaintiff 
[seeks] to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which 
the defendant previously litigated and lost against another 
plaintiff.”  Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
329 (1979). 
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precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.”  3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 9.1.  We are therefore generally obligated to follow our 
precedent absent en banc reconsideration.  United States v. 
Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009).  Nonetheless, a panel 
may revisit a prior holding of the Court “which conflicts with 
intervening Supreme Court precedent.”  In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 
82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Council of Alt. Political Parties 
v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing that 
reconsideration of an issue decided by another panel of our 
Court in a prior appeal is appropriate when there has been an 
intervening change in law).  Indeed, we are “compelled to 
apply the law announced by the Supreme Court as we find it 
on the date of our decision.”  Tann, 577 F.3d at 541 (quoting 
United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1980)); see also Mennen Co. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 147 
F.3d 287, 294 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that our Court’s 
Internal Operating Procedures must “give way when the prior 
panel’s holding is in conflict with Supreme Court precedent”).  
Our respect for the uniformity of decisions within this Court 
therefore must succumb when a prior holding of our Court — 
even an en banc decision — conflicts with a subsequent 
Supreme Court holding.  See United States v. Singletary, 268 
F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 
Adherence to our holding in Fitchik here must yield in 
light of the Supreme Court’s Regents of the University of 
California decision, which unquestionably presents an 
intervening shift in the applicable Eleventh Amendment 
immunity analytical framework.  Further, a reflexive 
application of our original Fitchik framework here would be at 
odds with the analytical approach employed by our esteemed 
colleagues in many other Eleventh Amendment cases, thus 
generating a potentially fractured body of jurisprudence.  
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Compare Cooper, 548 F.3d at 301, Febres v. Camden Bd. of 
Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2006), and Benn, 426 
F.3d at 239, with Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664.  In these 
circumstances, we are not bound to follow our prior balancing 
of factors in Fitchik.  We must instead examine each of the 
three Fitchik factors, balancing them equally, to determine 
whether NJ Transit’s relationship with the state entitles it to 
immunity under the “holistic analysis” compelled by the 
Regents of the University of California decision, see Benn, 426 
F.3d at 241, and to which we have adhered in our subsequent 
case law. 
 
1. 
 
Turning to the analysis of whether an entity is an arm of 
the state, we first ask “[w]hether the money that would pay the 
judgment would come from the state,” which includes 
considering “whether payment will come from the state’s 
treasury, whether the agency has the money to satisfy the 
judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized itself 
from responsibility for the agency’s debts.”  Fitchik, 873 F.2d 
at 659.  Our Court has observed that the “crux of the state-
treasury criterion” is not whether the state will be the principal 
source of any funding, but rather whether the state is “legally 
responsible for the payment of [the] judgment.”  Febres, 445 
F.3d at 233.   
 
The Fitchik Court concluded that NJ Transit is 
financially independent from the state.  See Fitchik, 873 F.2d 
at 660–62 (reviewing relevant financial details and observing 
that NJ Transit’s “money does not come predominantly from 
the state”).  The parties have not offered updated financial 
information to undermine this assessment.  NJ Transit instead 
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argues that because it relies on state funds to meet its operating 
deficit, an adverse judgment would have the practical effect of 
impacting the state treasury.  NJ Transit Br. 27–32.  NJ Transit, 
in support of this position, relies upon two cases in which 
Courts of Appeals have deemed transit operations arms of the 
state:  Alaska Cargo Transportation, Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 
5 F.3d 378 (9th Cir. 1993) and Morris v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 
1986).  In Alaska Cargo Transportation, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit afforded Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to the Alaska Railroad Corporation.  Although the 
state disclaimed liability for it by statute, Alaska still provided 
it a “financial safety net of broad dimension,” largely because 
federal law effectively required Alaska to keep the railroad 
operational.  Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc., 5 F.3d at 381 
(“Significantly, federal law further provides that, until 1994, 
the State of Alaska must continue to provide rail carrier 
services across its system.”).  Similarly, in Morris, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity was afforded to the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), an 
interstate transit system created by a congressional compact 
whose signatories were Maryland, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia.  781 F.2d at 219.  The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit determined that the practical 
result of any judgment against WMATA would be against the 
treasuries of Maryland and Virginia.  Id. at 225–26.  As in 
Alaska Cargo Transportation, Inc., the Morris Court’s 
conclusion was premised on the fact that congressional funding 
for the system was contingent on the states’ agreement to meet 
WMATA’s operating deficits.  Id.  NJ Transit maintains that 
both cases are applicable here, yielding the conclusion that the 
state-treasury factor likewise favors immunity for NJ Transit.  
 
16 
 
We do not agree, and NJ Transit’s reliance on both cases 
is misplaced.  We have consistently observed that both Alaska 
Cargo Transportation and Morris are inapplicable when 
Congress has not “put a proverbial ‘gun to the head’ of the 
State to sustain the entity even without a legal obligation.”  
Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 87 n.7; see also Cooper, 548 F.3d at 305 
(discussing but rejecting reliance on both cases because of the 
lack of congressional coercion); Febres, 445 F.3d at 235 n.9 
(distinguishing the cases to the “limited circumstances” under 
which federal law essentially requires the state to keep afloat 
the agency claiming immunity).  That is plainly not the case 
here, where the state is under no legal or other obligation to pay 
NJ Transit’s debts or to reimburse NJ Transit for any 
judgments that it pays.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-17.  Indeed, 
this case is much more similar to the Cooper case, where the 
state treasury factor did not favor immunity because the 
transportation agency claiming immunity could “satisfy the 
deficit itself by raising fares, reducing service, and/or laying 
off employees.”  Cooper, 548 F.3d at 305.  Moreover, New 
Jersey may choose to appropriate funds to help NJ Transit 
cover its operating deficit, but it is not obligated to do so.  To 
this end, NJ Transit concedes that it is not entirely reliant on 
state funds but rather that it receives a “combination of federal, 
state, and local funds” to balance its budget.  NJ Transit Br. 31.  
We therefore reject NJ Transit’s suggestion that the “practical 
effect” of a judgment would be equivalent to a “legal 
obligation” sufficient to satisfy the funding factor.  See 
Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 87 n.7.  The state-treasury factor, as a 
result, does not favor a finding of immunity in this case.  
 
2. 
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We turn next to the second Fitchik factor, which 
requires consideration of the status of the agency under state 
law.  Considerations include “how state law treats the agency 
generally, whether the entity is separately incorporated, 
whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and 
whether it is immune from state taxation.”  Fitchik, 873 F.2d 
at 659.  We have also considered “the entity’s authority to 
exercise the power of eminent domain, application of state 
administrative procedure and civil service laws to the entity, 
the entity’s ability to enter contracts and make purchases on its 
own behalf, and whether the entity owns its own real estate.”  
Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 91.  The Fitchik Court concluded that 
“[b]ecause [NJ Transit’s] status under New Jersey law is 
uncertain, the analysis of this factor does not significantly help 
in determining whether [NJ Transit] is entitled to immunity 
from suit in federal court.”  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662.  In the 
twenty-eight years since our Court’s decision in Fitchik, 
however, it has become much more apparent that New Jersey 
law regards NJ Transit as an arm of the state.  The state law 
factor therefore weighs strongly in favor of immunity.  
 
There is considerable indication that New Jersey law 
considers NJ Transit an arm of the state.  First, consistent with 
the New Jersey Constitution, NJ Transit is “allocated within 
the Department of Transportation,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-4, 
which is a principal department within the Executive Branch 
of the State of New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:1A-2.  NJ 
Transit, moreover, is statutorily “constituted as an 
instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential 
governmental functions.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-4.  Although 
NJ Transit can sue and be sued, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-5, this 
is not dispositive.  Cf. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) 
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(observing that a state does not “consent to suit in federal court 
merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued’”).  NJ 
Transit is also considered state property for tax purposes and is 
exempt from state taxation.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-16.  These 
factors favor immunity.  See, e.g., Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 
54 F.3d 1140, 1148 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that exemption from 
state property taxation is an attribute associated with 
sovereignty); Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 
244, 249 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that immunity from local 
taxation of real property favors immunity).  NJ Transit also has 
the power of eminent domain, N.J. Stat. § 27:25-13(a), (c)(1), 
which likewise favors immunity.  See, e.g., Christy, 54 F.3d at 
1148 (recognizing that the power of eminent domain is 
associated with sovereignty).  Finally, NJ Transit officers are 
vested with “general authority, without limitation, to exercise 
police powers and duties . . . in all criminal and traffic matters 
at all times throughout the State.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-
15.1(a).  This fact, too, supports the conclusion that New Jersey 
law regards NJ Transit as exercising the official police powers 
of the state.   
 
State case law also regards NJ Transit as an agency of 
the state.  For instance, in Muhammad v. New Jersey Transit, 
821 A.2d 1148 (N.J. 2003), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
surveyed its relevant case law and, to “remove any doubt,” 
declared that NJ Transit “is a public entity within the ambit of 
the [New Jersey Tort Claims Act].”  Id. at 1153; see also 
Cavuoti v. N.J. Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 563 (N.J. 1999) 
(holding that the New Jersey discrimination statute “allows the 
award of punitive damages against public entities” and 
affirming an award of punitive damages against NJ 
Transit);  Weiss v. N.J. Transit, 608 A.2d 254, 258 (N.J. 1992) 
(holding that NJ Transit is entitled to legislative immunity as a 
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public entity); Maison v. NJ Transit Corp., No. A-1761-14T2, 
2015 WL 4067411, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. (July 6, 
2015) (unpublished) (“NJ Transit is a public entity.”); Lopez 
v. N.J. Transit, 684 A.2d 986, 988  (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1996) (“Plaintiffs’ claim [is] against New Jersey Transit, a 
public entity”).  Several other New Jersey cases have also 
determined that NJ Transit is a surrogate of the state or is a 
state agency responsible for performing essential 
governmental functions.  See, e.g., Davis v. N.J. Transit, No. 
A-4901-10T1, 2012 WL 3192716, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Aug. 8, 2012) (unpublished) (“[NJ Transit] is a ‘surrogate 
of the State.’” (quoting Geod Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 678 
F. Supp. 2d 276, 288 (D.N.J. 2009))); N.J. Transit PBA Local 
304 v. N.J. Transit Corp., 675 A.2d 1180, 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996) (“[NJ Transit] is a state agency responsible 
for operating and improving public transportation in New 
Jersey.”), aff’d, 701 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 1997); see also N.J. 
Transit Corp. v. Mori, 89 A.3d 237, 239-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2014) (holding, in a condemnation action instituted 
by NJ Transit, that “[b]ecause NJ Transit was a public entity, 
it was entitled to a discounted 2.3 to 1 ratio of filled wetlands 
to mitigation credits.  A private developer, such as Mori, would 
have paid a high ratio.”).4  In light of this case law, it is apparent 
that the second Fitchik factor strongly favors a finding of 
                                              
4 Our dissenting colleague does not address these significant 
changes in New Jersey law, all of which post-dated 
our Fitchik decision.  Even assuming that the factual record 
has remained largely unchanged since our Court 
decided Fitchik, we cannot consider that “status under state 
law” factor as it was in 1989.  Rather, we must contend with 
relevant legal developments in the twenty-eight years since we 
first considered the issue.  
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immunity — a determination that has become that much more 
apparent since the original Fitchik decision.   
 
3. 
 
Third, we must consider the autonomy of the entity.  
The Fitchik Court concluded that state’s fairly “substantial 
control” over NJ Transit counseled in favor of according it 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664.  
Our consideration of this factor is largely in accord.  NJ Transit 
is subject to several operational constraints by the New Jersey 
Legislature and the Governor, who is also responsible for 
appointing the entire NJ Transit governing board, which is 
composed of several members of the Executive Branch.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 27:25-4(b); see, e.g., Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548–49 
(holding that a governor’s appointment of a state university’s 
entire governing board demonstrated a lack of autonomy 
favoring immunity); see also Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 
647 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In further support of the 
proposition that the University is an arm of the 
Commonwealth, we note that ten of the thirteen members of its 
governing board are appointed by the governor.”); Md. 
Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 257 (4th 
Cir. 2005).  The Commissioner of Transportation, an Executive 
Branch official who is the chairman of the NJ Transit 
governing board, has the power and duty to review NJ Transit’s 
expenditures and budget.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-20(a).  
Moreover, NJ Transit must annually report on its condition and 
its budget to the Governor and the Legislature and is subject to 
audit at any time.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-20.  The Governor 
can veto any action taken by NJ Transit’s governing board.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-4(f); see also Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664 
(“[T]he degree of control [of NJ Transit] by the governor is 
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fairly substantial.”).  Certain of its acquisitions are also subject 
to legislative veto.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:25-13(h). 
 
All of these facts suggest that NJ Transit is an 
instrumentality of the state, exercising limited autonomy apart 
from it.  See, e.g., Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548–49.  We conclude 
that the autonomy factor weighs in favor of immunity.   
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
After giving equal consideration to all three factors, we 
weigh and balance them.  We no longer adhere to the balancing 
analysis conducted in Fitchik in light of intervening changes in 
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis articulated by the 
Supreme Court.  Applying the revised analysis, we determine 
that while the state-treasury factor counsels against awarding 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the state law and autonomy 
factors both tilt in favor of immunity.  Indeed, in the 
intervening years since our decision in Fitchik, it has become 
apparent that the state law factor weighs heavily in favor of a 
finding of immunity.  Weighing and balancing the qualitative 
strength of each factor in the context of the circumstances 
presented, we hold that NJ Transit is an arm of the state.  We 
therefore conclude that NJ Transit is entitled to claim the 
protections of Eleventh Amendment immunity, which in turn 
functions as an absolute bar to any claims in this case against 
NJ Transit and the officers in their official capacities.5    
                                              
5 Defendants sued in their official capacities are entitled to 
claim the same Eleventh Amendment immunity that the 
“entity, qua entity, may possess.”  Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 159, 167 (1985).   
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B. 
 
 Karns and Parker argue that NJ Transit is liable for 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purportedly maintaining 
an unconstitutional custom of discriminatory enforcement of 
the permitting requirement.  Karns and Parker Br. 24.  They 
also claim that NJ Transit maintained a policy of promoting 
illegal arrests unsupported by probable cause.  Karns and 
Parker Br. 33–35.  Neither claim is viable.  
 
A plaintiff seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must 
establish that the individual or entity who allegedly committed 
the constitutional violation is a “person” for the purposes of § 
1983.  42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Indep. Enters. Inc. v. 
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1172 (3d Cir. 
1997).  “States or governmental entities that are considered 
‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not 
“persons” under § 1983.  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); see also Howlett By & Through 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (“Will establishes 
that the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally 
enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit 
under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.”).  As 
discussed at length above, see Section III(A), supra, NJ Transit 
is an arm of the state.  The Eleventh Amendment therefore 
functions as a complete bar, immunizing NJ Transit from any 
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§ 1983 liability.6  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
granting summary judgment in favor of NJ Transit as to the 
claims that it maintained unconstitutional policies.7  
 
IV. 
 
 Karns and Parker also brought several claims of 
constitutional wrongdoing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Officers Crowe and Shanahan in their individual 
capacities.  Karns and Parker specifically alleged that the 
officers violated:  (1) the First and Fourteenth Amendments by 
selectively enforcing N.J. Admin. Code § 16:83-1.4; (2) the 
First Amendment by arresting them in retaliation for their 
protected speech; (3) the Fourth Amendment by arresting them 
without probable cause; and (4) the First Amendment by 
                                              
6 We emphasize that the Eleventh Amendment and § 1983 
determinations are “analytically distinct,” although sometimes 
overlapping.  Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s 
Office, 769 F.3d 850, 857 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Callahan v. 
City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 669 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where, 
as here, the entity claiming immunity is determined to be an 
arm of the state, however, it is beyond dispute that it is not a 
“person” for § 1983 purposes.  See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.  
7 NJ Transit additionally argues that summary judgment is 
appropriate because Karns and Parker have failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence to support their unconstitutional permitting 
policy.  NJ Transit Br. 50.  The District Court did not reach the 
factual underpinnings of this claim against NJ Transit.  We, 
too, deem it unnecessary to analyze this claim because it is 
apparent that Karns and Parker cannot overcome the Eleventh 
Amendment bar in this case.   
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curtailing their right to record police officers during an 
investigative detention.  The District Court concluded that 
Crowe and Shanahan were entitled to qualified immunity as to 
each of these claims.  For the following reasons, we agree.  
 
A plaintiff seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must 
demonstrate “that the defendants, acting under color of law, 
violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, 
and thereby caused the complained of injury.”  Elmore v. 
Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).  The doctrine of 
qualified immunity, however, insulates government officials 
from lawsuits, shielding them “from undue interference with 
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”  
Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994)).  
In determining the applicability of qualified immunity, courts 
examine two prongs.  First, whether the facts alleged (in the 
context of a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the 
pleadings) or shown (in the context of a motion for summary 
judgment or a trial) “make out a violation of a constitutional 
right.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  
Second, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at 
the time of defendants’ alleged 
misconduct.”  Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 
(2001)).  A right is “clearly established” when its “contours . . 
. [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”  Wilson 
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (quotation marks omitted).  
Courts need not evaluate the two prongs sequentially, Pearson, 
555 U.S. at 236, and the failure of either prong will result in 
application of qualified immunity, James v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).    
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A. 
 
 Karns and Parker first argue that the officers were not 
entitled to qualified immunity on their selective enforcement 
claim8 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Upon 
reviewing the record and considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, we agree with the District 
Court that Karns and Parker failed to establish a selective 
enforcement claim adequate to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right 
would have been violated were the allegations established, 
there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 
immunity.”).   
 
A plaintiff seeking to establish a selective enforcement 
claim must demonstrate (1) that he was treated differently from 
other similarly situated individuals;9 and (2) that this selective 
treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, 
religion, some other arbitrary factor or to prevent the exercise 
of a fundamental right.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 
181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010); Gov’t of V.I. v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 
34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986).  Hence, to maintain a selective 
                                              
8 This claim arises from Karns’s and Parker’s contention that 
NJ Transit’s permitting policy was selectively enforced against 
religious speech or speech that the officers deemed 
“subjectively objectionable.”  Karns and Parker Br. 19.   
 
9 “Persons are similarly situated . . . when they are alike in ‘all 
relevant aspects.’”  Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 
183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 
1, 10 (1992)). 
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enforcement claim, a plaintiff must provide “evidence of 
discriminatory purpose, not mere unequal treatment or adverse 
effect.”  Jewish Home of E. Pa. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 
Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 684 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing that the mere fact that similarly situated parties 
are treated differently does not by itself establish an actionable 
selective enforcement claim).  A federal constitutional 
violation does not exist merely because of the “exercise of 
some selectivity in enforcement.”  Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 
448, 456 (1962); see also Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 
303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is a strong presumption that 
the state actors have properly discharged their official duties, 
and to overcome that presumption the plaintiff must present 
clear evidence to the contrary; the standard is a demanding 
one.” (quoting Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 
(6th Cir. 1997))).   
 
Karns and Parker have proffered insufficient evidence 
to support a cognizable selective enforcement claim as a matter 
of law.  Indeed, apart from their wholly generalized allegation 
that “selective enforcement of the law by a state officer is a 
violation of the constitution,” Karns and Parker Br. 20, Karns 
and Parker point to no evidence that Officers Shanahan and 
Crowe treated similarly situated individuals differently.  They 
do not even identify other individuals who might be similarly 
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situated.10  Nor have Karns and Parker offered evidence of 
discriminatory purpose.  This lack of record evidence compels 
us to conclude that the selective enforcement claim lacks merit.  
See, e.g., Jewish Home of E. Pa., 693 F.3d at 363 (affirming 
judgment as a matter of law on a selective enforcement claim 
when the plaintiff failed to show that it was treated differently 
from other similarly situated entities and did not show 
discriminatory purpose); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 
357 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for the 
defendants when the plaintiff failed to produce any comparator 
evidence); Zahra, 48 F.3d at 684.  Even without inquiring as to 
whether the right Karns and Parker identify here is clearly 
established, the failure to establish a factual basis for the 
purported constitutional violation is an independently 
sufficient ground on which to affirm the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the individual officers.  See, e.g., Spady 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that courts may affirm on either prong of the qualified 
                                              
10 The sole evidence that Karns and Parker proffer in support 
of this claim is the deposition testimony of two NJ Transit 
employees who are responsible for preparing and approving 
non-commercial speech permits.  App. 559, 628.  According to 
that testimony, political candidates are not required to obtain 
permits to speak on NJ Transit property.  App. 559, 628.  Karns 
and Parker have not, however, offered any factual detail as to 
the identities of the political candidates against whom the 
permit requirement was purportedly unenforced.  Karns and 
Parker have also adduced no facts suggesting that Crowe and 
Shanahan were aware of such a purportedly discriminatory 
policy, much less involved in executing it with respect to the 
individual plaintiffs in this case.   
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immunity analysis).  Accordingly, the officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity and summary judgment was properly 
granted on the selective enforcement claim.  
 
B. 
 
We next address Karns’s and Parker’s retaliation claim.  
To establish unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment, 
a plaintiff must prove:  “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, 
(2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a 
causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and 
the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 
296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 
(3d Cir. 2003)).  Karns and Parker maintain that there was a 
genuine factual dispute as to whether their exercise of their 
First Amendment rights — namely, their protesting of the 
officers’ demands and their attempt to make a video recording 
of the officers — caused their subsequent arrest, thus 
precluding the entry of summary judgment.  Karns and Parker 
Br. 19, 23.   
 
Even assuming Karns and Parker could show sufficient 
facts supporting their retaliation claim, their claim fails on the 
“clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis.  
Karns and Parker maintain that the law was clearly established 
that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from 
subjecting individuals to retaliation for their protected speech.  
Karns and Parker Br. 22–23.  This articulation of the relevant 
right, however, “put[s] the question of whether the ‘clearly 
established’ standard has been met at much too high a level of 
abstraction.”  Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 175 
(3d Cir. 2016); see also Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615; Sharp v. 
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Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).  The proper inquiry, 
instead, is whether Karns and Parker had a “more specific right 
to be free from retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by 
probable cause.”  Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 (quoting Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012)).   
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reichle, which was 
decided just weeks before Karns’s and Parkers’ arrests, 
conclusively disposes of this inquiry.  The Court, on the facts 
of that case, held that “it was not clearly established that an 
arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First 
Amendment violation.”  566 U.S. at 670.  As we discuss in the 
next section, ample probable cause supported the arrests of 
Karns and Parker.  Given the state of the law at the relevant 
time period, it was therefore reasonable for the officers to 
believe that an arrest otherwise supported by probable cause 
would not violate Karns’s and Parker’s First Amendment 
rights.  The District Court did not err in concluding that the 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation 
claim. 
 
C. 
 
We turn to Karns’s and Parker’s claim alleging that the 
officers lacked probable cause to arrest them.  As noted, the 
determination of whether there was sufficient probable cause 
to support Karns’s and Parker’s arrests is relevant both to their 
First Amendment retaliation claim and to their Fourth 
Amendment claim that the officers lacked a reasonably 
objective basis for their arrests.  
 
Officers who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude that 
probable cause is present” are entitled to qualified immunity.  
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Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting Anderson 
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).  We employ an 
objective test to determine whether an arrest is without 
probable cause, looking to “the facts available to the officers at 
the moment of arrest.”  Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 
809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 
96 (1964)).  Probable cause exists when “the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
person to be arrested.”  United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 
1076 (3d Cir. 1990).  Although the probable cause inquiry is 
usually a question for the jury, courts “may conclude in the 
appropriate case . . . that probable cause did exist as a matter 
of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to [the p]laintiff, 
reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding.”  
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
 We look to the elements of the offense to determine 
whether an arrest was supported by probable cause.  See 
Wright, 409 F.3d at 602.  Karns and Parker were first charged 
with trespass under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b).  Under that 
statute, “[a] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense 
if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he 
enters or remains in any place as to which notice against 
trespass is given by . . . [a]ctual communication to the actor.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3(b).  Generally, there will be 
“sufficient circumstantial evidence to constitute probable 
cause” when there is “information supporting a conclusion that 
the potential defendant in a trespass case was not licensed or 
privileged and that he was so advised by the custodian of the 
property.”  Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 
2000).  This will “normally be true even where the potential 
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defendant, upon being confronted by a law enforcement 
officer, makes a claim of entitlement to be on the premises.”  
Id. 
 
The record in this case indicates that Parker knew that a 
permit was required to engage in speech at the station.  App. 
118, 244–45.  Moreover, the officers affirmatively informed 
Karns and Parker of this requirement before requesting that 
they vacate the platform.  Karns and Parker were, thus, well 
aware that they were not licensed to be on the train platform.  
Karns and Parker also led the officers to believe that they 
would remain on the platform despite knowing that they lacked 
the requisite permit.  These facts amply support the officers’ 
determination of probable cause that Karns and Parker were 
engaged in criminal trespass.  See Paff, 204 F.3d at 437.   
 
 As a result, Officers Shanahan and Crowe were entitled 
to qualified immunity on their claim that the officers arrested 
them without probable cause.11  
                                              
11 We decline to address whether Karns’s and Parker’s failure 
to produce valid identification created probable cause for the 
obstruction offenses, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1(a), (b).  The 
existence of probable cause as to the trespass offense is an 
independently adequate ground on which to affirm the award 
of qualified immunity to the officers on the Fourth Amendment 
claim.  See Barna, 42 F.3d at 819 (“[A]s long as the officers 
had some reasonable basis to believe [the arrestee] had 
committed a crime, the arrest is justified as being based on 
probable cause.  Probable cause need only exist as to any 
offense that could be charged under the circumstances.” 
(emphasis added)).  
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D. 
 
Turning finally to Karns’s and Parker’s “right to record” 
claim, it was not clearly established as of the date of Karns’s 
and Parker’s arrests that there was a First Amendment right to 
videotape police officers during an investigative stop.  In Kelly 
v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010), we 
concluded that there was “insufficient case law establishing a 
right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a 
reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that seizing a 
camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during 
the stop would violate the First Amendment.”  Id. at 262.  In 
light of this precedent, it was not unreasonable for the officers 
to regard their conduct as lawful.  Moreover, even if the instant 
case is distinguishable from Kelly on the basis that the 
encounter here was not a traffic stop, Karns and Parker have 
not offered a Circuit-level case supporting their position that 
the right to record was clearly established.  See Taylor v. 
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (“We do not require a 
case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed 
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 
(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 744)).12  The District Court 
                                              
12 In the intervening period since Karns’s and Parker’s arrests 
in 2012, our Court has held that “the First Amendment protects 
the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise recording 
police officers conducting their official duties in public.”  
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 
2017).  However, as in Fields itself, this right was not clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.  Id. at 362 
(“[W]e cannot say that the state of the law at the time of our 
cases (2012 and 2013) gave fair warning so that every 
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therefore did not err in concluding that the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity on the “right to record” claim.  
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s entry of summary judgment. 
                                              
reasonable officer knew that, absent some sort of expressive 
intent, recording public police activity was constitutionally 
protected.”).  Accordingly, although the right identified by 
Karns and Parker is now clearly established in this Circuit, our 
qualified immunity analysis in this case remains unchanged.  
See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) 
(observing that decisions “that postdate the conduct in question 
. . . are of no use in the clearly established inquiry” (citations 
omitted)).  
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 Were we writing on a blank slate, it would be within 
the prerogative of the Majority to decide this case as it does.  
But the slate is not blank. The precise question that we 
examine here, whether NJ Transit is an “arm of the state” 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,” we 
have already fully considered and resolved en banc in Fitchik 
v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc.1  Little has changed since 
we decided this question.  Thus, stare decisis, principles of 
estoppel, and our own Internal Operating Procedures all 
require that we decline the invitation to overrule Fitchik.  For 
this reason, I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority 
opinion.   
 
I.  
 The doctrine of stare decisis is simple:  Like cases 
should be decided alike.  We should not overturn our 
precedential opinions absent special justification.  Adherence 
to stare decisis thereby “permits society to presume that 
bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the 
proclivities of individuals[.]”2  Our effort to maintain a 
                                                 
1 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).   
2 United States v. Babich, 785 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986)); see 
also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare 
decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.”). 
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consistent and reliable body of jurisprudence is memorialized 
in our Internal Operating Procedures (I.O.P.), which state 
explicitly that “it is the tradition of this court that the holding 
of a panel in a precedential opinions is binding on subsequent 
panels.”3  En banc consideration by the full Court is required 
to overrule a prior precedential opinion.4    
 
 To be sure, there are exceptions to this rule.  As the 
Majority notes, we may—even without the blessing of an en 
banc majority—depart from a precedential opinion when its 
holding is in conflict with intervening Supreme Court 
authority.5  My colleagues permit New Jersey Transit and the 
Transit officers to wriggle through this loophole.  They 
suggest that Fitchik is no longer binding in light of the 
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Regents of the 
University of California.  The Majority then concludes that 
changes in the legal underpinnings of Fitchik justify 
overruling it.  I disagree with both holdings.   
 
A. Intervening Legal Changes Do Not Require 
Fitchik’s Overruling    
 Fitchik explains the analytical framework that we use 
to determine whether a state entity, such as NJ Transit, is “an 
arm of the state,” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Fitchik instructs us to employ a fact-intensive, three-factor 
balancing test.  We consider the funding factor, the status 
                                                 
3 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2015). 
4 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. 
5 See Maj. Op. 11-12; Mennen Co. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 147 
F.3d 287, 294 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998).    
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under state law factor, and the autonomy factor.6  After 
making an individual determination as to whether each factor 
supports a finding for or against immunity, we balance them 
to decide whether an entity is an arm of the state.7  After a 
thorough review of the facts as they pertain to each factor, the 
Fitchik Court held that NJ Transit is “not the alter ego of New 
Jersey [and] is not entitled to eleventh amendment 
immunity.”8 
 
 Fitchik treats the funding factor as the most important.9  
We recently explained, however, that “[w]hile our 
jurisprudence had long afforded the first factor—state 
funding—more weight than the others, we recalibrated the 
factors in light of the Supreme Court’s observation in Regents 
of the University of California v. Doe that an Eleventh 
Amendment inquiry should not be a ‘formalistic question of 
ultimate financial liability.’”10  Thus, “[w]e now treat all three 
Fitchik factors as ‘co-equals,’ with the funding factor 
breaking the tie in a close case.”11   
 Even though Fitchik explicitly acknowledges that no 
single factor is determinative in its evaluation, the Majority 
believes that its treatment of the funding factor as the most 
important warrants a complete overruling of the opinion.  But 
in Fitchik, we engaged in a qualitative assessment of each 
factor; we explicitly considered the degree to which each 
                                                 
6 Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 
2016).  
7 Id. at 84 (citing Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664).  
8 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664. 
9 Id. at 659-60.  
10 Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84 (internal citations omitted).  
11 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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factor counseled in favor of or against immunity.  Based on 
the record that was before us—which is largely unchanged 
today—we held that NJ Transit is not entitled to immunity 
because the funding factor “provides extremely strong 
indication that NJT is not the alter ego of New Jersey” while 
“[t]he other factors—NJT’s treatment under state law, and its 
degree of autonomy—provide only weak support for the 
conclusion that NJT is New Jersey’s alter ego.”12  Thus, 
Fitchik established that a showing of one factor can be strong 
enough to outweigh two factors that make weaker showings 
for the opposite outcome.  Central to this holding was the idea 
that the strength of each factor must be qualitatively weighed.   
 
 Neither the Supreme Court’s Regents of the University 
of California decision nor Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa.’s 
pronouncement that the factors are now “co-equal”13 
undercuts this aspect of Fitchik.  The Majority believes that 
Regents of the University of California requires courts to 
count the factors that favor or disfavor immunity, however 
slightly, and simply rule on the side of where two of the three 
factors lie.  The “holistic analysis” compelled by Regents of 
the University of California does not require this formalistic 
approach, and our subsequent cases—including Benn—do not 
either.  Benn, which explicitly considered Regents of the 
University of California, established only that no single 
Fitchik factor is “predominant” in our analysis.14  Our cases 
have since understood that no factor is entitled to presumptive 
                                                 
12 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664. 
13 Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
14 Cooper v. Se. PA Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Benn, 426 F.3d at 240). 
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weight, and no factor is independently dispositive.  This 
approach does not preclude Fitchik’s qualitative method, and 
we have not understood it to have done so.   
 
 The qualitative strength of each factor has consistently 
guided our analysis.  Febres v. Camden Board of Education15 
is demonstrative.  There we found that the autonomy factor 
“slightly favor[ed]” immunity while the other two factors—
funding and status—counseled against immunity.16  
Ultimately, we declined to recognize any immunity.17  In 
Cooper v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority, we 
again declined to recognize Eleventh Amendment immunity 
because, unlike the state status factor—which weighed 
“slightly” in favor of immunity—the autonomy and state 
funding factors together weighed “slightly” against a finding 
of immunity.18  Our consideration in Bowers v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association also explicitly considered the 
qualitative strength of each Fitchik factor.19  There we 
concluded that the university was an arm of the state because 
the state-treasury factor weighed only “slightly” against 
immunity and the status and autonomy factors weighed 
“heavily” in favor of it.20  As demonstrated, the cases we have 
decided after Regents of the University of California and 
Benn do not merely rely on a mechanical counting of the 
factors.  Instead, they explicitly assess the degree to which 
                                                 
15 445 F.3d 227 (3d Cir. 2006). 
16 Id. at 232, 237 (emphasis added).  
17 Id. at 237. 
18 548 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2008).   
19 475 F.3d 524, 549-50 (3d Cir. 2007), amended on reh’g 
(Mar. 8, 2007). 
20 Id. 
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each factor makes a showing.  That is because Fitchik 
requires—and Regents of the University of California 
permits—us to do so.        
 
 The fact that in cases such as Febres, Cooper, and 
Bowers, our assessment of the factors has declined to 
recognize immunity when at least two Fitchik factors have 
cautioned against such a finding does not change our 
conclusion.  Our post-Regents of the University of California 
cases have not considered a situation like the one we 
confronted in Fitchik—where one factor provides “extremely 
strong” support for one conclusion while the other two factors 
provide only “weak” support for the opposite outcome.  Thus, 
those decisions are distinguishable and do not necessarily 
conflict with Fitchik.  As a result, I do not believe that the 
circumstances here rise to the kind of exceptional 
circumstances we ordinarily require to warrant a departure 
from a precedential opinion absent en banc consideration.  
Fitchik can and should be read harmoniously with Regents of 
the University of California and our subsequent opinions.  
Only an en banc majority of our Court should decide whether 
the “strong indication” compelled by New Jersey Transit’s 
funding can be overcome by the “weak support” of the “state 
law” and “autonomy” factors.    
  
 The Majority, however, fears that our continued 
application of Fitchik could generate “a potentially fractured 
body of jurisprudence.”21  Indeed, when two of our decisions 
are inconsistent, one of them must yield.  But as I have 
explained, there is no inconsistency here.  And even if there 
were, overruling Fitchik would be the improper course.  We 
                                                 
21 Maj. Op. 12.  
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have “long held that if [this Circuit’s] cases conflict, the 
earlier is the controlling authority and the latter is ineffective 
as precedents.”22  In light of Fitchik’s continuing validity, it 
remains the opinion that governs because it came first.  So, to 
the extent that our post-Fitchik precedents are inconsistent 
with Fitchik in ways not required by Regents of the University 
of California, they are without effect.23  Fitchik remains the 
controlling authority and, as a result, this panel is foreclosed 
from reconsidering the question re-presented here.   
B. The Circumstances Have Not Changed So 
Significantly That Our  Reexamination Is Required  
 Our Court has long recognized that principles of 
estoppel permit a litigant who was not a party to a prior 
judgment to use that judgment to prevent a defendant from 
                                                 
22 Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
see also United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“In the unique circumstance when our panel decisions 
conflict and our Court has not spoken en banc, . . .the earlier 
decision is generally the controlling authority.” (citation 
omitted)) 
23 Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrections, 246 F.3d 267, 278 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]o the extent that [a case within the circuit] 
is read to be inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case 
law . . . controls.”); O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 
340, 354 (3d Cir.1981) (“[A] panel of this court cannot 
overrule a prior panel precedent.  To the extent that [the later 
case] is inconsistent with [the earlier case, the later case] must 
be deemed without effect.” (internal citation omitted)).  
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relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding.24  
Relying on this recognition, Karns and Parker argue that NJ 
Transit is collaterally estopped from claiming that it is an arm 
of the state because Fitchik conclusively rejected that 
argument.  They are right.  The Majority, however, believes 
that our reconsideration is appropriate because legal 
developments over the past twenty-seven years have changed 
the weighing of the factors upon which Fitchik was based.25  
In its view, a re-balancing of the factors in light of these 
alleged new circumstances clearly weighs in favor of 
sovereign immunity.  I disagree because the circumstances 
have remained largely unchanged.26   
 
 Fitchik held that the first factor—“whether the 
judgment would be paid by state funds—provides an 
extremely strong indication that NJT is not the alter ego of 
New Jersey.”27  As the Majority observes, NJ Transit has “not 
offered updated financial information to undermine this 
assessment.”28  Thus, for the reasons my colleagues note, this 
factor continues to “provide[] extremely strong indication” 
                                                 
24 Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 
F.3d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
25 Resp’t’s Br. 19; Maj. Op. 14-15 (contending that “[i]n the 
twenty-seven years since our Court’s decision in Fitchik,. . . it 
has become much more apparent that New Jersey law regards 
NJ Transit as an arm of the state.”).  
26
 In addition, as we state in Part A above, the strength of each 
of the factors found in Fitchik was weighed qualitatively, a 
procedure which is consistent with the approach of the Court 
in Regents of the University of California.  
27 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664.  
28 Maj. Op. at 13. 
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that NJ Transit is not the entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.29   
 
 The second Fitchik factor requires us to consider “[t]he 
status of the agency under state law . . ..”30  In Fitchik¸ we 
held that this factor “tilt[s] in favor of [the transit authority’s] 
contention that [NJ Transit Rail Operations] is entitled to 
sovereign immunity, but only slightly.”31  The Majority 
contends that “in the intervening years since our decision in 
Fitchik, it has become apparent that the state law factor 
weighs heavily in favor of a finding of immunity.”32  I 
disagree.   
 
 My colleagues conclude that the state law factor now 
favors a finding of immunity because NJ Transit is statutorily 
constituted as an instrumentality of the State, constitutionally 
allocated within the Department of Transportation, vested 
with the authority to exercise police powers, considered state 
property under state tax laws, designated as an “alter ego of 
the State” by a state’s trial and intermediate level courts, 
subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, and has the 
power of eminent domain.33  This evidence might be more 
compelling had our Court not considered it when NJ Transit 
first raised its immunity defense in Fitchik.  We explicitly 
recognized that “[t]here is some indication that New Jersey 
                                                 
29 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664. 
30 Id. at 663. 
31 Id. (emphasis added).     
32 Maj. Op. 19. 
33 Maj. Op. 15-17. 
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law considers [NJ Transit] to be an arm of the state,” 34 noting 
that  
 
[NJ Transit] is subject to New Jersey Tort 
Claims Act; is immune from state property 
tax; has the power of eminent domain; and is 
subject to the strictures of the state 
administrative procedure act. Further, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has declared [NJ 
Transit] to be a “public” entity, although not 
in the context of sovereign immunity.35 
Thus, NJ Transit’s allocation under the state constitution and 
the fact that it possesses official police powers are the only 
facts set forth here that we did not explicitly consider in 
Fitchik.  I doubt that these facts are so significant that they 
warrant a new determination by this panel.  NJ Transit offers 
the fact of the constitution’s treatment of the transit body to 
show that New Jersey deems it an instrumentality of the State 
exercising essential governmental functions.  But Fitchik 
fully appreciated that, under state law, NJ Transit seems to be 
an arm of the state.36  That fact, however, was not 
conclusive.37  I also doubt that the grant of official police 
powers to NJ Transit alone requires a change in our Fitchik 
                                                 
34 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662. 
35 Id. at 662-663 (citations omitted).  
36 Id. at 662 (“There is some indication that New Jersey law 
considers [NJ Transit] to be an arm of the state.”). 
37 Id. at 663 (“On the other side of the equation, New Jersey 
has given power to NJT in two spheres that Urbano identified 
as indicative that an agency is not entitled to sovereign 
immunity.”). 
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holding.38  In light of the foregoing, I cannot conclude that NJ 
Transit has presented new evidence requiring us to hold that 
the second Fitchik factor now “strongly favors a finding of 
immunity.”39   
 
 Under the third factor, we consider the degree of 
autonomy the entity has from the State.40  Weighing the 
pertinent facts—which have not since changed in any 
meaningful way—the Fitchik Court concluded that although 
NJ Transit is “significantly autonomous,” the final Fitchik 
factor “counsels slightly in favor of according immunity.”41  
That is principally because “the degree of control by the 
governor is fairly substantial . . ..”42  The Majority’s 
“consideration of this factor is largely in accord,” and thus 
does not suggest that new circumstances with respect to this 
factor warrant our reexamination.43   
 NJ Transit suggests that there are additional 
considerations that compel us to conclude that the factor here 
“weighs heavily in finding immunity.”44  Their argument is 
based on the fact that (1) NJ Transit’s board must present its 
annual budget to the governor and legislature, (2) the New 
                                                 
38 NJ Transit does not suggest that its enforcement officers 
did not have general police authority at the time Fitchik was 
decided.  Indeed, the statutory provision granting New Jersey 
Transit officers general police powers appears to have been 
passed in 1989, well before Fitchik. 
39 Maj. Op. 17. 
40 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. 
41 Id. at 664. 
42 Id. 
43 Maj. Op. 18. 
44 Resp’t’s Br. 27.  
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Jersey governor appoints the entire board, and (3) the transit 
system’s acquisition of privately owned transportation entities 
are subject to legislative veto.  These arguments were all 
made in Fitchik’s dissenting opinion.45  Because the Fitchik 
majority considered them and remained unpersuaded, we are 
bound by its conclusion.  Accordingly, this factor continues to 
only “counsel slightly in favor of according immunity to 
NJT” in light of Fitchik.46 
 
 As demonstrated, NJ Transit’s funding scheme, status 
under state law, and organizational structure have remained 
largely unchanged over the last twenty-seven years.  NJ 
Transit’s arguments here were fully considered and resolved 
in Fitchik; as a result, principles of collateral estoppel 
preclude NJ Transit from relitigating them here.  
 
III.  
 In light of the principles underlying the doctrines of 
stare decisis and collateral estoppel, it has been the tradition 
of this court to refrain from overturning our precedents 
“lightly.”47  Today we depart from that tradition.  Because I 
believe we do so unjustifiably, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
45 Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 667-68 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) 
46 Id. at 664. 
47 Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 734 
F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).  
